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I must although I can't!? Suggestions for a two-level theory of ‘ought implies can’ ...
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Abstract:
The ‘Ought implies can’ principle (OIC) states that if you lack the ability to do X, then you are not morally obligated to do X. While philosophers believed it to be both normatively adequate and intuitively compelling, recent empirical findings suggest that laypeople reject OIC. In this paper, we suggest a pragmatically grounded model of the relationship between ought- and can-judgments to account for such findings. More specifically we argue that ‘ought’ is pragmatically used in two ways: namely as either expressing an obligation or recommending an action. We further argue that also ‘can’ is understood in two different ways: it can either describe a person’s general physical and mental faculties, or refer to a situation-specific ability. In two experiments, we show that moral obligations imply general abilities, and that moral imperatives imply situation-specific abilities. Once these two levels are carefully discriminated in empirical research, participants give responses that support OIC. ...
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Keyword:
FOS Languages and literature; FOS Psychology; Linguistics; Psychology; Semantics and Pragmatics; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Theory and Philosophy
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URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.17605/osf.io/hyq9u
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/hyq9u
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