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Risk in War: Using History to Inform a Common Method for Understanding and Communicating Risk in Joint Operations
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 22 |
Processes for Assessing Outcomes of Multi-national Missions (Processus d'evaluation des resultats de missions multinationales)
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 23 |
Pursuing the Human Domain Risks Reinvesting on the Basics
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 24 |
Controlled English for Effective Communication during Coalition Operations
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 25 |
Conveying the Complex: Updating U.S. Joint Systems Analysis Doctrine with Complexity Theory
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 26 |
Impacts of Worldview, Implicit Assumptions, Biases, and Groupthink on Israeli Operational Plans in 1973
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In: DTIC (2013)
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Abstract:
This monograph examines the impact of cognitive constructs such as worldview, complexity, implicit assumptions, biases, groupthink, and cognitive blind spots on Israeli operational planning during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Documentation of this conflict provides insight into the inner workings of Israeli planning groups. The investigation shows that Israeli leaders and planners struggled with cognitive biases, flawed assumptions, faulty worldview, and groupthink. The biases included anchoring, status quo bias, confirmation bias, sunk-cost bias, framing trap, halo and pitchfork effect, narrative fallacy, and the self-fulfilling prophecy bias. These cognitive constructs affected Israeli operations and the relationship between operational planners and strategic leaders.
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Keyword:
*ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 1973; *BIAS; *COGNITIVE BIASES; *COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTS; *COGNITIVE SCIENCE; *GROUP DYNAMICS; *ISRAELIS; *LEADERSHIP; *MILITARY PLANNING; *WARFARE; ARABS; CASE STUDIES; COGNITIVE BLIND SPOTS; COMPLEXITY; EGYPT; GOLAN HEIGHTS; GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN); GROUPTHINK; Humanities and History; IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS; ISRAEL; ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE; MILITARY COMMANDERS; MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN); MILITARY HISTORY; Military Operations; OCTOBER WAR; OPERATIONAL PLANNING; PREJUDICES; Psychology; Strategy and Tactics; SUEZ CANAL; SYRIA; WORLDVIEW; YOM KIPPUR WAR
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URL: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA584193
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA584193
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| 27 |
Multinational Intelligence Issues: What the Operational Commander Can Do To Mitigate Them
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 28 |
Cultural Competence and the Operational Level of War
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 29 |
The Center of Gravity Concept: A Study of Its Description and Application in Two Different Eras
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 30 |
Interacting with Multi-Robot Systems Using BML
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 32 |
Multinational Experiment 7: Access to the Global Commons. Objective 3.3 Lexicon and Abbreviations. Version 1.1
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 33 |
Understanding and Communicating through Narratives
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 34 |
Semantic and Social Networks Comparison for the Haiti Earthquake Relief Operations from APAN Data Sources using Lexical Link Analysis (LLA)
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 36 |
Child Adjustment to Parental Combat Deployment: Risk and Resilience Models
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 37 |
Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations: A New Paradigm
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 38 |
Intelligence Fusion Paradigm: Understanding Complex Operational Environments Implementing the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 39 |
The Vietnam Cauldron: Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia
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In: DTIC (2012)
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