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Batalhas de MC: um estudo sobre (im)polidez e categorização axiológica à luz da pragmática / MC Battles: a study on (im)politeness and axiological categorization under the light of pragmatics
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In: Revista de Estudos da Linguagem, Vol 28, Iss 4, Pp 1983-2004 (2020) (2020)
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Intelligence Fusion Paradigm: Understanding Complex Operational Environments Implementing the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
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In: DTIC (2012)
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Distance Education and Community Learning Networks linked by a Library of Culture
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In: Student Affairs Digital Community Development (2011)
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Major General George Crook's Use of Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare during the Great Sioux War of 1876-77
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In: DTIC (2008)
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Coalition Combat: Supporting South Korean Forces
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In: DTIC (2001)
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Abstract:
From 1950 to 1953, with only a partial mobilization, the Army fought in Korea, bolstered its presence in Europe, and organized an air defense artillery system on the homefront. Success in these endeavors depended significantly on the capability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) army to stand and fight. Firepower, particularly field artillery, was an advantage that U.N. forces enjoyed during the war. Because the Koreans were lacking in artillery, American units were frequently tasked for support. U.S. artillery men had inadequate doctrine, combined operations training, and equipment. Moreover, they had to overcome differences in language, culture, and skill levels, and also fears that the Koreans would collapse when attacked, leaving the artillery men exposed to enemy infantry. Efforts to provide field artillery support were successful overall. American gunners often made the difference between victory and failure despite linguistic and cultural barriers even though firepower by itself could not always compensate for the weaknesses of ROK forces. Thus, a lot of emphasis was placed on expanding Korean firepower in the last two years of combat, especially field artillery, and improving the skill of the units employing it. American field artillery support for Korean units met with mixed results. In instances when both U.S. and Korean units were competent, had dynamic leadership, and developed a long-term relationship, like the association of 1st ROK Division and 10th Group, the results were equal to or superior to those found on average in U.S. units. U.S. firepower could often, but not always, prevent the collapse or destruction of Korean units which, because of weaknesses in firepower, skill, and leadership, became a focus of enemy offensives. American artillery men -- called upon to conduct missions for which they were unprepared in doctrine, training, and resources -- usually persevered, though not without extensive improvisation, hard work, and heavy losses. ; Published in Joint Force Quarterly, p71-77, Spring-Summer 2001.
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Keyword:
*ARMY; *ARTILLERY UNITS; *FIRE SUPPORT; *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES; *KOREAN WAR; *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN); *REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY; ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS; ARTILLERY FIRE; BATTLES; CHINA; CHINESE ARMED FORCES; CLOSE SUPPORT; COMBINED OPERATIONS; CULTURAL DIFFERENCES; EIGHTH ARMY; FIELD ARTILLERY UNITS; FIREPOWER; GUNNERS; Humanities and History; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES; LEADERSHIP; MILITARY HISTORY; Military Operations; PROFICIENCY; REPRINTS; SKILLS; SOUTH KOREA; Strategy and Tactics
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URL: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA516619
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA516619
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Near-Real-Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield: The Requirement for a Combat Information System.
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1994)
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National-Level Intelligence and the Operational Commander: Improving Support to the Theater
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1994)
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Battle of the Bulge: Intelligence Lessons for Today.
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1993)
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Intelligence and Surprise: The Battles of Midway
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1993)
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The Electronic Pivot of Maneuver: The Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) (MI BN (CEWI))
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1993)
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The Operational Use of Intelligence: What to Avoid
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1992)
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Avoiding Surprise: The Role of Intelligence Collection and Analysis at the Operational Level of War
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1992)
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Intelligence Lessons Learned from the Battle for Crete, May 1941
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1992)
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Intelligence Communications: Have We Put Into Practice the Lessons Learned in Grenada?
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1991)
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Seeing the Airland Battlefield: Can the Heavy Division Military Intelligence Battalion do Its Job
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1991)
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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB): One Size Fits All
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1991)
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