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Open Source Intelligence - Doctrine's Neglected Child
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2003)
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| 62 |
Intelligence: In A Rut, with Some Vectors Out
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In: DTIC (2003)
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| 63 |
USAF Psychological Operations, 1990-2003
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2003)
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| 64 |
Projecting Organic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: A Critical Requirement of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
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In: DTIC (2003)
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| 65 |
What Happened To Bai? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre-Desert Storm to 2001
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2002)
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| 66 |
Towards an Intellectual Component of Joint Doctrine: The Philosophy and Practice of Experimental Intelligence
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2002)
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| 67 |
Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
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In: DTIC (2002)
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| 68 |
Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process
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In: DTIC (2002)
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| 69 |
Hyperspectral Imagery: Warfighting Through a Different Set of Eyes
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In: DTIC (2002)
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| 70 |
Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities
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In: DTIC (2002)
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| 71 |
Forward from the Sea . Intelligence and the Untold Story of Operation NOBLE OBELISK
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2000)
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| 72 |
Joint Theater Missile Defense: The Problem with Active Defense Doctrine
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2000)
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| 73 |
Bounded Rationality and Complex Process Coupling: Challenges for Intelligence Support to Information Warfare
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2000)
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| 74 |
Complexity and Planning in the 21st Century: Intelligence Requirements to Unlock the Mystery
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (2000)
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| 75 |
Equipping the Marine Corps for Intelligence Fusion
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In: DTIC (2000)
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| 76 |
The Battle of the Bulge Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1999)
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| 77 |
An Analysis of the Impact of Network-Centric Warfare on the Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Intelligence at the Operational Level
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1999)
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| 78 |
Optimizing Intelligence Sharing in a Coalition Environment: Why U.S. Operational Commanders Have an Intelligence Dissemination Challenge
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1999)
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Abstract:
Future U.S. military operations and military operations other than war will almost certainly involve other allied nations or entities. U.S. operational commanders must develop a framework for the dissemination of intelligence information to appropriate recipients in their area of operations. U.S. policy, particularly DCID 516 and NDP-l, provides guidance on intelligence sharing, however joint and service doctrine often makes the operational commander's responsibilities confusing. Of all the elements of the intelligence cycle, optimal intelligence dissemination becomes critical in a multinational environment by enhancing coalition unity of effort and force protection from the planning stage through war termination. NATO Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR provided examples of difficulties with intelligence disclosure, among them a lack of timely releasable intelligence, each nation's reliance on its own intelligence capabilities, and the intelligence differences inherent among the nations. Sharing intelligence becomes difficult for the U.S. because of sensitive sources and means, national differences within a coalition, sophisticated technologies, the lack of multi-level security systems, other nations' security programs, and U.S. policy. While change is difficult, change is necessary. Provisions for tailored releasable intelligence for a coalition must be made as early as possible. U.S. national intelligence agencies are adjusting to that need. Both operational commanders and the national agencies have major roles in the improvement of intelligence sharing in a multinational environment.
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Keyword:
*MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR; *POLITICAL ALLIANCES; INFORMATION TRANSFER; MILITARY COMMANDERS; MILITARY DOCTRINE; Military Intelligence; Military Operations; NATIONAL SECURITY; OPTIMIZATION; Strategy and Tactics
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URL: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA370627
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA370627
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| 79 |
Futures Intelligence: Assessing Intelligence Support to Three Army Long-Range Planning Communities
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1998)
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| 80 |
Competing Visions of Aerospace Power: A Language for the 21st Century.
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In: DTIC AND NTIS (1997)
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