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Why the United States Must Adopt Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
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The Importance of Why: An Intelligence Approach for a Multi-Polar World
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A Commonsense Approach to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations
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ПРЕПОДАВАНИЕ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОЙ ЛЕКСИКИ БУДУЩИМ СОТРУДНИКАМ ЧРЕЗВЫЧАЙНЫХ ВЕДОМСТВ СТРАН СНГ КАК СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКАЯ ЗАДАЧА РОССИЙСКОГО ВОЕННОГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ
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СОЛОМАХИНА Т.Ю.. - : Федеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования «Академия гражданской защиты МЧС России», 2015
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Application of Operational Art - The German 8th Army at the Battles at Tannenberg 1914
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Strong Artificial Intelligence and National Security: Operational and Strategic Implications
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In: DTIC (2015)
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Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking
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In: DTIC (2015)
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Just War Theory and Presidential Discourse Prior to Conflict
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In: DTIC (2014)
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A Methodology to Improving Unity of Effort for Mission Partner Planning
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In: DTIC (2014)
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Interwar Period Leavenworth Student Papers: Perceptions of Airpower and Implications Regarding Effectiveness of the Leavenworth Schools
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In: DTIC (2014)
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Abstract:
This thesis evaluates interwar period U.S. Army officer perceptions of aviation as expressed in student papers written as part of the Command and General Staff School during the 1930s. The evaluation compares student perceptions to period airpower theory and doctrine and applies that study to weigh-in on the broader debate over the effectiveness of Fort Leavenworth during the interwar period. America's School for War and Command Culture by Dr. Peter Schifferle and Dr. Jorg Muth, respectively, highlight the competing sides of that debate. Schifferle argues Leavenworth was a key component to the U.S. victory in World War II while Muth argues the U.S. victory occurred in spite of Leavenworth teaching faulty doctrine and stifling critical thinking. This study concludes that the students generally agreed with period doctrine while also rejecting many of the ideas of airpower theorists. However, application of the study to the question of Leavenworth effectiveness yields mixed results. The papers indicate the doctrine, which formed the basis of Leavenworth instruction, was appropriate for the time. Nonetheless, they also suggest Leavenworth's willingness to part with critical thinking development (in the form of writing) in favor of more classroom instruction - instruction of debatable effectiveness.
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Keyword:
*AIR POWER; ARMY PERSONNEL; DOCTRINE; Military Operations; PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY); Strategy and Tactics; STUDENT PAPERS; STUDENTS; THEORY; THESES; WRITING
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URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA612704 http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA612704
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The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
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In: DTIC (2014)
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Arctic Operations: Don't Forget Cultural Intelligence
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In: DTIC (2014)
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Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
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In: DTIC (2014)
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Process-oriented Approach to Designing Immersion Assessments
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In: DTIC (2014)
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Risk in War: Using History to Inform a Common Method for Understanding and Communicating Risk in Joint Operations
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In: DTIC (2013)
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Processes for Assessing Outcomes of Multi-national Missions (Processus d'evaluation des resultats de missions multinationales)
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In: DTIC (2013)
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Pursuing the Human Domain Risks Reinvesting on the Basics
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In: DTIC (2013)
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