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Why the United States Must Adopt Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
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| 3 |
The Importance of Why: An Intelligence Approach for a Multi-Polar World
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A Commonsense Approach to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations
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ПРЕПОДАВАНИЕ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОЙ ЛЕКСИКИ БУДУЩИМ СОТРУДНИКАМ ЧРЕЗВЫЧАЙНЫХ ВЕДОМСТВ СТРАН СНГ КАК СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКАЯ ЗАДАЧА РОССИЙСКОГО ВОЕННОГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ
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СОЛОМАХИНА Т.Ю.. - : Федеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования «Академия гражданской защиты МЧС России», 2015
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| 7 |
Application of Operational Art - The German 8th Army at the Battles at Tannenberg 1914
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| 8 |
Strong Artificial Intelligence and National Security: Operational and Strategic Implications
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In: DTIC (2015)
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| 9 |
Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking
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In: DTIC (2015)
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Abstract:
Albert Einstein famously stated that: Any fool can know; the point is to understand. Over the past 20 years, the United States has known that there exist people with a profound hatred of all that it and the West are, and all that it stands for. During that time the American people and our allies abroad have known war in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and we know that today in Syria, Iraq, in Nigeria and North Africa those enemies plan and plot more violence and more hatred against us. Yet, do we really understand? If there is one observation that has been repeated by military commanders and policymakers alike from almost every nation in our various coalitions, it is the idea that we have not understood our adversary properly. Our nations have the world s most sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities. We are masters of electronic intelligence, of human intelligence, of signal intelligence, open-source intelligence, and technical intelligence. Yet for all that intelligence, it is a truism that the Arab Spring passed us by; the despicable attacks of September 11, 2001, came as a surprise and the emergence of the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was not predicted. In this monograph, one of the world s leading experts in Information Operations explains the science behind what he calls population intelligence (POPINT). He explains how sophisticated social science research and behavioral profiling can be used to warn us of impeding issues, and how that information might be used by senior strategy makers as a tool for testing and refining strategy. This is not some ethereal dream; Dr. Tatham shows us that these techniques have been used already to great success. Yet he argues, forcefully, that we are collectively still caught up in old ideas and thinking. ; Part of the Letort Papers series.
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Keyword:
*BEHAVIOR; *DECISION MAKING; *INTELLIGENCE; *SOCIAL SCIENCES; BEHAVIORAL PROFILING; CIVILIAN POPULATION; CRIMEA; Government and Political Science; ISIS(ISLAMIC STATES IN IRAQ AND SYRIA); Military Intelligence; POLICIES; POPINT(POPULATION INTELLIGENCE); Psychology; SOCIAL MEDIA; Sociology and Law; STRATEGIC LEVEL DECISION MAKING; STRATEGY; TAA(TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS); Unconventional Warfare
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URL: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA623135
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA623135
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| 10 |
Just War Theory and Presidential Discourse Prior to Conflict
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 11 |
A Methodology to Improving Unity of Effort for Mission Partner Planning
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 12 |
Interwar Period Leavenworth Student Papers: Perceptions of Airpower and Implications Regarding Effectiveness of the Leavenworth Schools
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 14 |
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 15 |
Arctic Operations: Don't Forget Cultural Intelligence
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 16 |
Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 17 |
Process-oriented Approach to Designing Immersion Assessments
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 18 |
Risk in War: Using History to Inform a Common Method for Understanding and Communicating Risk in Joint Operations
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 19 |
Processes for Assessing Outcomes of Multi-national Missions (Processus d'evaluation des resultats de missions multinationales)
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 20 |
Pursuing the Human Domain Risks Reinvesting on the Basics
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In: DTIC (2013)
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