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All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year Sort by creator [A → Z]' creator [Z → A]' publishing year ↑ (asc)' publishing year ↓ (desc)' title [A → Z]' title [Z → A]' Simple Search Page: 1...270 271 272 273 274 Hits 5.461 – 5.465 of 5.465 5461 Mark my words! Linguistic Cristian Danescu-niculescu-mizil; Michael Gamon; Susan Dumais In: http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/sdumais/fr862-danescu-niculescu-mizil.pdf BASE Show details 5462 CoupledLP: Link Prediction in Coupled Networks In: http://keg.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/jietang/publications/kdd15-Dong-et-al-link-prediction-in-coupled-networks.pdf BASE Show details 5463 2011b. Social Context Summarization Zi Yang; Keke Caiy; Jie Tang... In: http://keg.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/jietang/publications/SIGIR11-Yang-et-al-social-context-summarization.pdf BASE Show details 5464 The Effects of Feedback on Human Behavior in Social Media: An Inverse Reinforcement Learning Model Sanmay Das; Allen Lavoie In: http://www.cse.wustl.edu/%7Eallenlavoie/papers/reddit.pdf BASE Show details 5465 ABSTRACT Alexander Kress In: http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~cebly/Papers/limPrecBid-draft.pdf Abstract: We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the number of bits required to determine approximately optimal allocations by sequentially asking bidders to reveal their valuations with increasing precision, and limiting participation to those bidders who might win. We prove several necessary conditions that severely restrict the space of mechanisms satisfying our criteria. We also study empirically the optimization of the parameters of our sequential mechanisms, and how number of bidders and cost of communication impact expected amount of communication, expected loss in welfare, and other measures. Finally, we show that incremental limited-precision mechanisms offer advantages over fixed, single-shot mechanisms. Keyword: Categories and Subject Descriptors J.4 [Computer Applications; Distributed Artificial Intelligence—intelligent agents; I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence; multiagent systems Keywords auctions; Social and Behavioral Sciences— economics URL: http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~cebly/Papers/limPrecBid-draft.pdf http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.78.5124 BASE Hide details Page: 1...270 271 272 273 274

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