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A commonsense reasoning framework for explanatory emotion attribution, generation and re-classification
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| 62 |
The relationship between cognitive ability and BOLD activation across sleep–wake states
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In: Brain and Mind Institute Researchers' Publications (2021)
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| 64 |
Exploring different aspects of emotion understanding in adults with Down Syndrome
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| 65 |
Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees
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In: UNF Faculty Publications (2021)
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| 66 |
Analogical reasoning by corvids using a new experimental paradigm
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| 67 |
Learning To Compositionally Reason Over Natural Language
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In: Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations (2021)
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| 68 |
Rethinking analogical reasoning: The power of stimuli and task framework in understanding biomedical science, technological advancements, and social interactions
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| 69 |
Exploring the Contributions of Word Knowledge and Figural Reasoning Ability to College Students' Performance on a Measure of Relational Reasoning with Words
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| 70 |
Knowing and Expressing Ourselves
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Abstract:
This dissertation concerns two epistemologically puzzling phenomena. The first phenomenon is the authority that each of us has over our minds. Roughly, to have authority is to be owed (and to tend to receive) a special sort of deference when self-ascribing your current mental states. The second phenomenon is our privileged and peculiar self-knowledge. Roughly, self-knowledge is privileged insofar as one knows ones mental states in a way that is highly epistemically secure relative to other varieties of contingent empirical knowledge. Roughly, one has peculiar self-knowledge insofar as one acquires it in a way that is available only to oneself. In Chapter One I consider several more detailed specifications of the authority of self-ascriptions. Some specifications emphasize the relative indubitability of our self-ascriptions, while others focus on their presumptive truth. In Chapter Two I defend a Neo-Expressivist explanation of authority. According to Neo-Expressivism, self-ascriptions are authoritative insofar as they are acts that put ones mental states on display for others, whether or not these mental states are also known by the self-ascriber with privilege and peculiarity. However, I do not dispute that we often have privileged and peculiar self-knowledge. This raises the question of what such knowledge does explain, if not the authority of our self-ascriptions. In Chapter Three I examine several extant answers to this question, focusing on privileged and peculiar self-knowledge of the propositional attitudes. Each answer meets with objections. In Chapter Four I develop a Social Agentialist account of the explanatory indispensability of privileged and peculiar self-knowledge. I argue that such knowledge enables at least three forms of social-epistemic agency: interpersonal reasoning, complex group action, and linguistic interpretation. Next, I argue that, even though privileged and peculiar self-knowledge does not explain the authority of our self-ascriptions, it is importantly related to our (Neo-Expressively understood) authority. In Chapter Five I consider possible sources of our privileged and peculiar self-knowledge, focusing again on propositional-attitudinal self-knowledge. I eventually defend a Constitutivist view. This is the view that, for agents who meet certain background conditions, self-knowledge is privileged and peculiar because it is metaphysically built into the attitudes self-known.
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Keyword:
Cognitive Agency; Constitutivism; Critical Reasoning; First-Person Authority; Inference; Philosophy; Privileged Access; Self-Expression; Self-Knowledge; Transparency to the World
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URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10315/38428
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| 71 |
Causal selection – the linguistic take
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In: Experiments in Linguistic Meaning; Vol 1 (2021); 27-38 ; 2694-1791 (2021)
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| 73 |
Cartesian Systemic Emergence and its Resonance Thinking Facet: Why and How?
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In: ISSN: 1942-261X ; International Journal On Advances in Systems and Measurements ; https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02902575 ; International Journal On Advances in Systems and Measurements, IARIA, 2020, International Journal on Advances in Systems and Measurements, issn 1942-261x, Volume 13 (Number 1 & 2), pp.11-25 ; http://www.iariajournals.org/systems_and_measurements/ (2020)
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| 74 |
Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey’s rule
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In: ISSN: 0039-7857 ; EISSN: 1573-0964 ; Synthese ; https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02864932 ; Synthese, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2020, ⟨10.1007/s11229-020-02536-z⟩ (2020)
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| 75 |
Neural representations of transitive relations predict current and future math calculation skills in children
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In: ISSN: 0028-3932 ; EISSN: 1873-3514 ; Neuropsychologia ; https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02988649 ; Neuropsychologia, Elsevier, 2020, 141, pp.107410. ⟨10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2020.107410⟩ (2020)
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| 77 |
Adapting Implicit Stereotype Expectation Through Perspective Distancing
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In: Capstone Showcase (2020)
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| 78 |
« POUR REFLECHIR FAUT BOUGER SES MAINS » COMMENT LES GESTES METAPHORIQUES PARTICIPENT À LA CONSTRUCTION COLLECTIVE D'ANALOGIES COGNITIVES EN COMMUNAUTE DE RECHERCHE PHILOSOPHIQUE ?
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In: Philosopher avec les enfants 2020 ; https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03583635 ; A. Fournel, J.-P. Simon, S. Lagrange-Lanaspre, J.-M. Colletta (Coord.). Philosopher avec les enfants 2020, Presses universitaires Blaise-Pascal, pp.461-484, 2020 (2020)
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| 79 |
Language Acquisition with Echo State Networks: Towards Unsupervised Learning
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In: ICDL 2020 - IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning ; https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02926613 ; ICDL 2020 - IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning, Oct 2020, Valparaiso / Virtual, Chile (2020)
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| 80 |
The French Correction: When Retrieval is Harder to Specify than Adaptation
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In: ICCBR 2020 - 28th International Conference on Case-Based Reasoning ; https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02964141 ; ICCBR 2020 - 28th International Conference on Case-Based Reasoning, Jun 2020, Salamanca / Virtual, Spain. pp.15, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-58342-2_20⟩ ; http://iccbr20.org/ (2020)
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