DE eng

Search in the Catalogues and Directories

Hits 1 – 17 of 17

1
Managing Refugee Protection Crises: Policy Lessons from Economics and Political Science
Hangartner, Dominik; Sarvimäki, Matti; Spirig, Judith. - : Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2021
BASE
Show details
2
The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation
Crutzen, Benoit S Y; Konishi, Hideo; Sahuguet, Nicolas. - : Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 2021
BASE
Show details
3
Die Qual der Methodenwahl ... : Vorwort ...
Gmeinbauer, Christina; Polak-Rottmann, Sebastian; Purkarthofer, Florian. - : Abteilung für Japanologie, Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften, Universität Wien, 2020
BASE
Show details
4
Die Autor*innen und ihre Forschungsfelder + Back Matter ...
Purkarthofer, Florian. - : Abteilung für Japanologie, Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften, Universität Wien, 2020
BASE
Show details
5
Quantitatives Denken und statistische Analyse ...
Lützeler, Ralph. - : Abteilung für Japanologie, Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften, Universität Wien, 2020
BASE
Show details
6
A rationale for unanimity in committees
In: SP II 2017-308 ; Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels ; 41 (2020)
BASE
Show details
7
Decolonization, Property Rights and Language Conflicts
Dasgupta, Indraneel; Neogi, Ranajoy Guha. - : Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2017
BASE
Show details
8
Consequences of culture and diversity for governmental redistribution
Gründler, Klaus; Köllner, Sebastian. - : Würzburg: Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy, 2017
BASE
Show details
9
Confusing categories: peasants, politics and national identities in the multilingual state, Belgium c. 1880-1940.
Van Molle, Leen. - : Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria (SEHA), 2016
BASE
Show details
10
Human capital inequality and electoral outcomes in South Africa
Bedasso, Biniam; Obikili, Nonso. - : Helsinki: The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), 2016
BASE
Show details
11
Fair oder Foul? Punktevergabe und Platzierung beim Eurovision Song Contest
Millner, Ralf; Stoetzer, Matthias Wolfgang; Fritze, Christina. - : Jena: Ernst-Abbe-Hochschule, Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaft, 2015
BASE
Show details
12
Anonymous social influence
In: ISSN: 0899-8256 ; EISSN: 1090-2473 ; Games and Economic Behavior ; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00913235 ; Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2013, pp.621-635 (2013)
BASE
Show details
13
Lexicographic Voting
Klingelhöfer, Jan. - : ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, 2011
BASE
Show details
14
More than words: Communication in intergroup conflicts
Leibbrandt, Andreas; Sääksvuori, Lauri. - : Jena: Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, 2010
BASE
Show details
15
Product Diversity and Ethnic Fragmentation: Is Heterogeneity Good or Bad for Media Capture?
In: http://www.edge-page.net/jamb2008/Papers/Media_August08.pdf (2008)
BASE
Show details
16
Community Size, Heterogeneity and Voter Turnouts
Kaniovski, Serguei; Mueller, Dennis C.. - : Vienna: Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 2005
BASE
Show details
17
Ordinal cheap talk
Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick. - : Claremont, CA: Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics, 2003
Abstract: Can comparative statements be credible even when absolute statements are not? For instance, can a professor credibly rank different students for a prospective employer even if she has an incentive to exaggerate the merits of each student? Or can an analyst credibly rank different stocks even if the client would be dubious about a recommendation to buy any one of them? We examine such problems in a multidimensional sender-receiver game where the sender has private information about multiple variables. We show that ordinal cheap talk, in which the variables are completely ordered by value or grouped into categories by value, can be credible even when interests are too opposed to support communication along any single dimension. Ordinal cheap talk is credible because it reveals both favorable and unfavorable information at the same time, thereby precluding any possibility of exaggeration. The communication gains from ordinal cheap talk can be substantial with only a couple of dimensions, and the payoffs from a complete ordering are asymptotically equivalent to full revelation as the number of variables becomes large. However, in some circumstances the sender can do better through a partial ordering that categorizes variables. Compared to other forms of cheap talk, ordinal cheap talk is exceedingly simple in that the sender only makes straightforward, comparative statements.
Keyword: Asymmetrische Information; C72; cheap talk; credibility; D72; D74; D82; ddc:330; Kommunikation; Kooperatives Spiel; Prestige; Theorie
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23380
BASE
Hide details

Catalogues
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bibliographies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Linked Open Data catalogues
0
Online resources
0
0
0
0
Open access documents
17
0
0
0
0
© 2013 - 2024 Lin|gu|is|tik | Imprint | Privacy Policy | Datenschutzeinstellungen ändern