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1
Concept of gradable knowledge
Lai, Changsheng. - : The University of Edinburgh, 2019
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2
Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue
Smart, Paul R.. - : Oxford University Press, 2018
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3
The bountiful mind: memory, cognition and knowledge acquisition in Plato’s Meno
Beaugrand, Selina. - : The University of Edinburgh, 2016
Abstract: The Meno has traditionally been viewed as "one of Plato's earliest and most noteworthy forays into epistemology." In this dialogue, and in the course of a discussion between Socrates and his young interlocutor, Meno, about the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught, “Meno raises an epistemological question unprecedented in the Socratic dialogues.” This question - or rather, dilemma - has come to be known in the philosophical literature as Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry, due its apparently containing an easy-to-detect equivocation of the word ‘know’. Immediately after the paradox, and in an apparent response to it, Socrates recounts a myth: a story told by priests and priestesses about the pre-natal existence and immortality of the soul. From this this myth, Socrates concocts the infamous theory of recollection – a theory according to which the soul has acquired knowledge of everything before it was born, while in a disincarnate state. According to the traditional reading of Meno’s paradox, this theory constitutes Plato’s response to it. The traditional reading has come under fire in recent years by advocates of the epistemological reading (ERM), who argue that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s intended response to the paradox. Instead, they suggest, Plato’s distinction between true belief and knowledge – which appears towards the end of the dialogue – is sufficient for solving the paradox; and as such, it ought to be read as Plato’s response to it. In this thesis, I argue against ERM’s claim that a mere epistemological distinction is all it takes to solve the paradox. To do so, I explore the metaphysics of change in Plato’s ontology. From this, I appeal to our everyday notion of ‘memory’ in order to show that Meno’s paradox, in fact, contains a hidden-premise, which when laid bare, reveals two distinct challenges contained within the argument: a superficial one, and a deeper one. I argue that although it appears at first blush as though the former could easily be dismissed as an equivocation, to which the epistemological distinction between belief and knowledge could provide an answer, the latter cannot. This is because the deeper challenge threatens the very preconditions of knowledge itself – that is to say, it renders cognition impossible – and, as such, it cancels out any effort to provide an epistemological response to the superficial challenge. Hence, unless the deeper-level challenge is satisfactorily disarmed, both challenges remain unanswered. I argue that although the major motivation for the theory of recollection in the Meno is indeed to provide an answer to scepticism about knowledge, nevertheless, it ought to be understood, first, as a theory of cognition – i.e. as a theory about the preconditions and atomic building blocks of knowledge – and not a theory of knowledge per se. This answer comes in the form of a radical theory of the mind and cognition – one that stands in stark opposition to our common-sense views about the mind: a view from which, Plato believed, the paradox arises. Drawing on recent debates between Nativists and Empiricists in the Cognitive Sciences, I argue that it was a great achievement of Plato’s to grasp that our common-sense view about the mind, and its concomitant process of learning, language acquisition and knowledge acquisition, might in fact be at the very root of scepticism about our ability to engage in meaningful philosophical practice, and our ability to acquire objective knowledge – especially, objective moral knowledge. The Meno’s paradox, then – so I contend - is not a puzzle whose solution rests upon merely pointing to an epistemological distinction between true belief and knowledge, as advocates of ERM have suggested. Rather, it is a puzzle about cognition. More precisely, it is a puzzle that targets the rudimentary cognitive stages of initial cognition and truth-recognition - one whose solution entails offering an account of the mind that would make these elementary cognitive processes possible. Accordingly, Plato’s theory of recollection in the Meno ought to be read as an attempt to map the structure of the mind, and as such, to provide an account of cognition. In doing so, he intended to put forward a view about the preconditions of knowledge – the sort of preconditions without which language acquisition and knowledge acquisition would simply not be possible. With this theory, Plato has the beginnings of an argument against the kind of relativism and scepticism prevalent at his time. As such, a correct interpretation of the so-called paradox of inquiry (and Plato’s proposed solution to it via the theory of recollection) should approach it as a puzzle about mind and cognition – and not solely as an epistemological one, as it has previously been treated.
Keyword: cognition; epistemology; knowledge acquisition; Meno’s Paradox; Plato; theory of recollection
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/23451
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4
The Modal Account of Luck
In: Metaphilosophy. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell 45 (2014) 4, 594-619
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5
Introductory Note
In: Metaphilosophy. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell 45 (2014) 4, 475-476
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6
What is this thing called knowledge?
Pritchard, Duncan. - London [u.a.] : Routledge, 2013
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UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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7
Epistemic contextualism: a normative approach
McKenna, Robert James. - : The University of Edinburgh, 2013
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8
Nature and value of knowledge : epistemic environmentalism
Ryan, Shane Gavin. - : The University of Edinburgh, 2013
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9
Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing
In: Synthese. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science+Business Media 189 (2012) 2, 255-272
OLC Linguistik
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10
Epistemological disjunctivism
Pritchard, Duncan. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 2012
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UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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11
The nature and value of knowledge : three investigations
Millar, Alan; Pritchard, Duncan; Haddock, Adrian. - Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 2012
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UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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12
The Routledge companion to epistemology
Pritchard, Duncan (Hrsg.); Bernecker, Sven (Hrsg.). - London [u.a.] : Routledge, 2011
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UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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13
Evidentialism and its discontents : [arguments ; including replies by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman]
Bergmann, Michael; Feldman, Richard; Greco, John. - Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 2011
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UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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14
Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis
In: Synthese. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science+Business Media 175 (2010), 133-151
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15
Arguing about knowledge
Neta, Ram (Herausgeber); Pritchard, Duncan (Herausgeber). - New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009
UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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16
Defusing epistemic relativism
In: Synthese. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science+Business Media 166 (2009) 2, 397-412
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OLC Linguistik
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17
Introduction [to: "The philosophy of Crispin Wright"]
In: Synthese. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science+Business Media 171 (2009) 3, 357-358
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OLC Linguistik
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18
Wright 'contra' McDowell on perceptual knowledge and scepticism
In: Synthese. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science+Business Media 171 (2009) 3, 467-479
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OLC Linguistik
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19
Knowledge
Pritchard, Duncan. - Basingstoke [u.a.] : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009
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UB Frankfurt Linguistik
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20
The possibility of knowledge : [including commentary and authors' response]
In: Analysis. - Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press 69 (2009) 2, 307-333
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