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Descriptions, truth value intuitions, and questions
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In: ISSN: 0165-0157 ; EISSN: 1573-0549 ; Linguistics and Philosophy ; https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00577970 ; Linguistics and Philosophy, Springer Verlag, 2010, 32 (6), pp.583-617. ⟨10.1007/s10988-010-9069-y⟩ (2010)
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Abstract:
International audience ; Since the famous debate between Russell (Mind 14: 479–493, 1905, Mind 66: 385–389, 1957) and Strawson (Mind 59: 320–344, 1950; Introduction to logical theory, 1952; Theoria, 30: 96–118, 1964) linguistic intuitions about truth values have been considered notoriously unreliable as a guide to the semantics of definite descriptions. As a result, most existing semantic analyses of definites leave a large number of intuitions unexplained. In this paper, I explore the nature of the relationship between truth value intuitions and non-referring definites. Inspired by comments in Strawson (Introduction to logical theory, 1964), I argue that given certain systematic considerations, one can provide a structured explanation of conflicting intuitions. I show that the intuitions of falsity, which proponents of a Russellian analysis often appeal to, result from evaluating sentences in relation to specific questions in context. This is shown by developing a method for predicting when sentences containing non-referring definites elicit intuitions of falsity. My proposed analysis draws importantly on Roberts (in: Yoon & Kathol (eds.) OSU working papers in Linguistics: vol. 49: Papers in Semantics 1998; in: Horn & Ward (eds.) Handbook of pragmatics, 2004) and recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of focus.
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Keyword:
Definites; Pragmatics; Presuppositions; Prosodic focus; Questions; Semantics; Topic; Truth value intuitions
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URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00577970/document https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00577970/file/PEER_stage2_10.1007%252Fs10988-010-9069-y.pdf https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00577970 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-010-9069-y
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