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The object : substance :: event : process analogy
Wellwood, Alexis; Hespos, Susan J. (R20509); Rips, Lance J.. - : U.K., Oxford University Press, 2018
Abstract: Linguists say that sentences are about events. Philosophers debate the metaphysics of event identity. Cognitive scientists posit event concepts to explain how creatures like us represent and reason about the world, and developmental psychologists ask how we come to have those concepts. But do we mean the same thing by ‘event’ (Casati and Varzi 2008; cf. Goldman 2007)? Our project aims to shed light on this question, in part, by studying the relationship between event semantics and event representations in the psychologist’s sense. Broadly, it explores the thesis that the semantic structure of event quantification, originally introduced into the literature with a metaphysical interpretation (Davidson 1967), reveals properties of how the mind structures its experience of the world. We investigate how language and representation relate in the event domain by following the lead of other semanticists and psychologists in analogizing to the object domain. Semantically, the referential properties of mass nouns like water, count nouns like cup, and plural noun phrases like cups are identifiable by demonstrating different combinations of cumulative, divisive, atomic, or plural reference (for early discussion, see Quine 1960, Cheng 1973, Cartwright 1975, Massey 1976, Burge 1977, Bunt 1979, 1985, Link 1983, Krifka 1989). Often, these combinations are understood to reflect real-world ontology: nouns that refer like water apply to substances, while cup applies to objects, and cups to pluralities of objects (Parsons 1979, Link 1983, Champollion 2010, among many others). Observing seemingly parallel referential properties in the verbal domain (Taylor 1977, Bach 1986a), many have adopted a parallel theory: verb phrases like sleep apply to processes or activities, while ‘once-only’ die applies to events, and jump (again and again) applies to pluralities of events. We aim to understand these properties in representational, rather than strict ontological terms.
Keyword: XXXXXX - Unknown
URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0009
https://hdl.handle.net/1959.7/uws:62133
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001/oso-9780198815259-chapter-9
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2
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
In: Prof. Khoo via Mark Szarko (2016)
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3
Syntax and intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 133 (2014) 1, 249-261
OLC Linguistik
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4
The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
Jenkins, Adrianna C.; Dodell-Feder, David; Saxe, Rebecca. - : Public Library of Science, 2014
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5
The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
In: Public Library of Science (2014)
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6
Thinking like a scientist: innateness as a case study
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 126 (2013) 1, 72-86
BLLDB
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7
Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 127 (2013) 2, 242-257
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8
Not all mutualism is fair, and not all fairness is mutualistic
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 36 (2013) 1, 100-101
OLC Linguistik
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9
Folk Moral Relativism
In: Mind & language. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell 26 (2011) 4, 482-505
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10
Action Trees and Moral Judgment
In: Topics in cognitive science. - Hoboken, NJ [u.a.] : Wiley 2 (2010) 3, 555-578
OLC Linguistik
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11
Fixing the default position in Knobe's competence model
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 352-353
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12
“Stupid people deserve what they get”: The effects of personality assessment on judgments of intentional action
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 332-334
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13
Scientists and the folk have the same concepts
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 344
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14
Are mental states assessed relative to what most people “should” or “would” think? Prescriptive and descriptive components of expected attitudes
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 341-343
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15
Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 334-335
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16
Are we really moralizing creatures through and through?
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 351-352
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17
Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 349-350
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18
Qualitative judgments, quantitative judgments, and norm-sensitivity
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 335-336
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19
Person as moral scientist
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 340
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20
Putting normativity in its proper place
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 344-345
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