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Risk in War: Using History to Inform a Common Method for Understanding and Communicating Risk in Joint Operations
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 2 |
Processes for Assessing Outcomes of Multi-national Missions (Processus d'evaluation des resultats de missions multinationales)
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 3 |
Controlled English for Effective Communication during Coalition Operations
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 4 |
Multinational Intelligence Issues: What the Operational Commander Can Do To Mitigate Them
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 5 |
Cultural Competence and the Operational Level of War
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 6 |
The Center of Gravity Concept: A Study of Its Description and Application in Two Different Eras
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 7 |
Multinational Experiment 7: Access to the Global Commons. Objective 3.3 Lexicon and Abbreviations. Version 1.1
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 8 |
Language (Medical Terminology) Assistance to Multinational Partners in Coalition Operations
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 9 |
Conference Report: Cultural and Linguistic Advancement for Mission Success: Enhancing Language, Regional and Cultural Capabilities Across Whole of Government for an Effective COIN Strategy
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 10 |
Operational Design that Synthesizes Art and Science
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In: DTIC (2011)
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| 11 |
Intercultural Competency at the Geographic Combatant Command Level
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In: DTIC (2011)
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| 12 |
Refining Intelligence Support to Irregular Warfare
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In: DTIC (2010)
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| 13 |
Developing Geospatial Intelligence Stewardship for Multinational Operations
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In: DTIC (2010)
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| 15 |
The Evolution of Defense HUMINT through Post Conflict Iraq
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In: DTIC (2009)
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| 16 |
A Requirement for a National Intelligence Support Team in Direct Support of Special Operations Forces Task Groups in Multinational Operations
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In: DTIC (2009)
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| 17 |
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
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In: DTIC (2008)
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| 18 |
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements
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In: DTIC (2008)
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| 19 |
Fighting for Intelligence: The Design of Intelligence-Led Operations
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In: DTIC (2008)
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Abstract:
Achieving the level of learning, understanding, and systems thinking necessary to cope with modern, complex rivals and operating environments requires a reciprocal and carefully designed relationship between operations and intelligence. A paradigm shift in the joint force approach to understanding modern adversaries is long overdue. Learning and understanding the ever-changing structure and relationships of rival systems requires active interaction rather than a pursuit of "actionable intelligence" through periodic sampling with passive collection. Significant elements of our operations must now be directed towards creating conditions for learning and understanding. Joint doctrine requires subordination of intelligence to other forms of operations, making it difficult for the inverse to occur when necessary. To cope with uncertainty and complexity, a new paradigm for understanding the adversary and operating environment must emerge. Intelligence-led operations -- the purposeful interaction to gain awareness, understanding, and leverage over rival systems -- should be the foundation of this new paradigm. Intelligence-led operations should originate from the operational art and design of a campaign. By applying the heuristics of systems thinking and operational design to this problem, an intellectual foundation for the continual design of intelligence-led operations can be established. In modern campaigning, fighting for intelligence is as necessary as fighting with it. We have to interact with rival systems and learn from that interaction if we are to succeed. Intelligence-led operations create the necessary reciprocal relationships that allow for such success. The purpose of intelligence-led operations is to increase understanding of rival systems, an outcome that ultimately benefits all lines of operation. Operational design provides the framework to develop and guide intelligence in the pursuit of systemic awareness as well as campaign goals and objectives.
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Keyword:
*ASYMMETRIC WARFARE; *INTELLIGENCE; *INTELLIGENCE-LED OPERATIONS; *INTERACTIONS; *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES; *MILITARY ART; *MILITARY PLANNING; *SYSTEMS APPROACH; ADAPTATION; BEHAVIOR; COGNITION; CREATIVITY; DISCRIMINATION; ENEMY; HEURISTIC METHODS; JOINT DOCTRINE; LEARNING; LLO(LOGICAL LINE OF OPERATION); MILITARY DOCTRINE; Military Intelligence; OBSERVATION; OPERATIONAL ART; OPERATIONAL DESIGN; OPERATIONAL PLANNING; Psychology; SYSTEMIC AWARENESS; THESES; UNCERTAINTY; Unconventional Warfare
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URL: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA504937
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA504937
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| 20 |
Social Sensemaking in Multinational Groups: A Common Ground Approach
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In: DTIC (2008)
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