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Using Technology to Expand and Enhance Applied Behavioral Analysis Programs for Children with Autism in Military Families
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In: DTIC (2012)
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42 |
Evaluating DLAB as a Predictor of Foreign Language Learning
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In: DTIC (2012)
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43 |
Examine Ways to Decrease Training Duration While Maintaining Training Objective
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In: DTIC (2012)
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44 |
Analysis of the ILR Can Do Statements as a SOFTS Placement Tool
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In: DTIC (2012)
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45 |
Aligning Learning Capability with Strategy: A Training Needs Assessment (TNA) Case Study
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In: DTIC (2012)
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Establish Best Practices for Supervision of Instructors
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In: DTIC (2012)
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47 |
Examine the Impact of Training Duration on Retention
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In: DTIC (2012)
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48 |
Trainee Characteristics and Achievement during Special Operations Forces Initial Acquisition Foreign Language Training
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In: DTIC (2012)
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49 |
United States Special Operations Command's Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus at ILR 1/1+: Initial Review and Recommended Changes to Improve Results and Lower Cost
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In: DTIC (2012)
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'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944
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Abstract:
Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.
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Keyword:
1st Canadian Infantry Division; 5th Canadian Armoured Division; Air Photo Intelligence; British Intelligence Corps; Burt Hoffmeister; Canadian Intelligence Corps; Chris Vokes; Corps of Guides; Counter Battery; Counter Mortar; Darcy Kingsmill; Edgar Bill Williams; Eighth Army; ELM Burns; First Canadian Interrogation Team; Gustav Line; Hitler Line; I Canadian Corps; Intelligence; Intelligence Doctrine; Intelligence Planning; Intelligence Training; Interrogation; Italian Campaign; Liri Valley; Military Intelligence; North African Campaign; Operation DIADEM; Operation HONKER; Prisoner of War; Second World War; SIGINT; Signals Intelligence; Special Wireless Service; Ultra; War Intelligence Course
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URL: https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-6076 http://hdl.handle.net/10393/23327
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51 |
Help a brother out : a case study in multinational intelligence sharing, NATO SOF
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52 |
Advance
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In: Advance (Division of Continuing Education Catalog) (2011)
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53 |
Developing Operationally-Proficient Linguists: It's About Time
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In: DTIC (2011)
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54 |
Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to Improve Visibility and Sustainment of Knowledge and Skills in Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces
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In: DTIC (2011)
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55 |
Improved Pricing and Oversight Needed for the Afghan Air Force Pilot and English Language Training Task Order
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In: DTIC (2011)
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56 |
Creating Operational Culture Skills Capability within Conventional Force Leaders
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In: DTIC (2011)
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57 |
Joint Terminology: At the Heart of Doctrine
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In: DTIC (2011)
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Air Commando Intel: Optimizing Specialization Training for Air Force Special Operations Command Intelligence Officers
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In: DTIC (2011)
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59 |
Establishing a Framework for Intelligence Education and Training
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In: DTIC (2011)
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Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB). Volume 37, Number 2, April-June 2011
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In: DTIC (2011)
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