1 |
The Importance of Why: An Intelligence Approach for a Multi-Polar World
|
|
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
3 |
Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2015)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
4 |
Training Cyber Warriors: What Can Be Learned from Defense Language Training?
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2015)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
5 |
Using Target Network Modelling to Increase Battlespace Agility
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2013)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
6 |
Enabling Efficient Intelligence Analysis in Degraded Environments
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2013)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
8 |
Conference Report: Cultural and Linguistic Advancement for Mission Success: Enhancing Language, Regional and Cultural Capabilities Across Whole of Government for an Effective COIN Strategy
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2012)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
9 |
An Exit Strategy Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons from the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2012)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
10 |
Preventing Intelligence Failures in an Unpredictable 21st Century
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2012)
|
|
Abstract:
Intelligence is a fundamental element of national security; however, history is littered with intelligence failures. Intelligence is about gathering information to inform our decisions and make better choices. Ultimately, intelligence will always be imperfect and, as history demonstrates, surprise can never be completely prevented. Despite intelligence reform legislation enacted on December 17, 2004 to prevent another 9/11, the United States (U.S.) intelligence community (IC) is guaranteed to experience intelligence failure(s) within the foreseeable future. The contemporary security environment presents a particularly difficult challenge for strategic intelligence warning. In the post-9/11 world, intelligence must move faster and must leverage all sources of intelligence. This paper contends that the current intelligence cycle model has major flaws. In short, the current intelligence cycle is not adaptive enough to keep up with, much less get ahead of, today's priority intelligence targets (e.g., nonstate actors, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorist groups), which are greater in number and often more obscure in character than ever before. The purpose of the paper is threefold: discuss the anatomy of intelligence, diagnose the general causes and consequences of intelligence failures, and prescribe an antidote for pathologies that contribute to failures. ; Strategy Research Project.
|
|
Keyword:
*DIAGNOSIS(GENERAL); *FAILURE; *INTELLIGENCE; *INTELLIGENCE FAILURES; *INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS; *PATHOLOGY; *PREVENTION; CRIMES; CRIMINALS; FORECASTING; INDICATORS; INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; INTELLIGENCE CYCLE; LEGISLATION; Military Intelligence; NATIONAL SECURITY; NONSTATE ACTORS; POLICIES; POST-9/11 ERA; PREDICTIONS; Sociology and Law; STRATEGIC WARNING; SURPRISE; TERRORISM; TERRORIST GROUPS; TERRORISTS; THREAT WARNINGS; THREATS; TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS; Unconventional Warfare
|
|
URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA560770 http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA560770
|
|
BASE
|
|
Hide details
|
|
11 |
Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2012)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
13 |
Research on Using Cellular Technology for a Motivational Intervention Among OEF/OIF Veteran's with PTSD
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2012)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
14 |
Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2011)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
15 |
Analyzing Taliban taranas (Chants): An Effective Afghan Propaganda Artifact
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2011)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
16 |
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence - Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations
|
|
In: DTIC (2011)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
17 |
An Intelligence-Sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2011)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
18 |
Knowing What We Knew: Intelligence Failures and Knowledge Management
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2011)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
19 |
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2011)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
20 |
The International Nexus Between Drugs and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy
|
|
|
|
In: DTIC (2010)
|
|
BASE
|
|
Show details
|
|
|
|