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The Importance of Why: An Intelligence Approach for a Multi-Polar World
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Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking
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In: DTIC (2015)
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Training Cyber Warriors: What Can Be Learned from Defense Language Training?
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In: DTIC (2015)
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Using Target Network Modelling to Increase Battlespace Agility
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In: DTIC (2013)
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Enabling Efficient Intelligence Analysis in Degraded Environments
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In: DTIC (2013)
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Conference Report: Cultural and Linguistic Advancement for Mission Success: Enhancing Language, Regional and Cultural Capabilities Across Whole of Government for an Effective COIN Strategy
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In: DTIC (2012)
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An Exit Strategy Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons from the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67
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In: DTIC (2012)
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Preventing Intelligence Failures in an Unpredictable 21st Century
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In: DTIC (2012)
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Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria
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In: DTIC (2012)
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Research on Using Cellular Technology for a Motivational Intervention Among OEF/OIF Veteran's with PTSD
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In: DTIC (2012)
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14 |
Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan
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In: DTIC (2011)
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Analyzing Taliban taranas (Chants): An Effective Afghan Propaganda Artifact
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In: DTIC (2011)
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Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence - Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations
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In: DTIC (2011)
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An Intelligence-Sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts
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In: DTIC (2011)
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Abstract:
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a major catalyst for intelligence reform in the United States. Since this date, most government agencies have strived to evolve and advance in this capacity. One such way has been through the development of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary intelligence centers, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the 72 state and major urban area fusion centers established throughout the nation. However, despite the changes that have occurred throughout the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, significant issues still remain that are impeding the creation and flow of actionable intelligence to support domestic counterterrorism efforts. This has been identified from research conducted on numerous sources. Several policy, technological, cultural, and political challenges exist, all contributing to the less-than-perfect nature of the United States' existing counterterrorism framework. This thesis aims to identify potential solutions that leverage existing intelligence operations to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum across all tiers of U.S. government. The author provides an analysis of specific priority issues that require fixing within our nation's counterterrorism system, and provides evidence-based recommendations to improve the capability and value of existing intelligence support structures and further-develop the desired intelligence-sharing continuum. The primary research question is as follows: What practices and processes should be implemented among state and major urban area fusion centers and the Intelligence Community to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum and make fusion centers more effective in meeting the needs of their consumers? ; The original document contains color images.
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Keyword:
*COUNTERTERRORISM; *DATA FUSION; *FUSION CENTERS; *INFORMATION EXCHANGE; *INTELLIGENCE; *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; *INTELLIGENCE REFORM; *INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTINUUM; *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION; *LOCAL GOVERNMENT; *STATE GOVERNMENT; *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT; DELPHI METHOD; DELPHI TECHNIQUES; DOMESTIC TERRORISM; Government and Political Science; HOMELAND SECURITY; ITACG(INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION GROUP); LAW ENFORCEMENT; Military Intelligence; NCTC(NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER); PUBLIC HEALTH; PUBLIC SAFETY; STATE FUSION CENTERS; THESES; THREATS; Unconventional Warfare; URBAN AREAS; URBAN FUSION CENTERS
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URL: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA551882 http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA551882
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Knowing What We Knew: Intelligence Failures and Knowledge Management
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In: DTIC (2011)
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Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress
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In: DTIC (2011)
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The International Nexus Between Drugs and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy
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In: DTIC (2010)
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