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Intelligence and Design: Thinking about Operational Art
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In: DTIC (2014)
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| 2 |
The intelligence problem of policymakers in counterinsurgency: asking and answering the right questions
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| 3 |
Enabling Efficient Intelligence Analysis in Degraded Environments
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 4 |
Cultural Competence and the Operational Level of War
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 5 |
Automated Extraction and Characterisation of Social Network Data from Unstructured Sources -- An Ontology-Based Approach
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In: DTIC (2013)
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| 6 |
Understanding and Communicating through Narratives
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 8 |
Conference Report: Cultural and Linguistic Advancement for Mission Success: Enhancing Language, Regional and Cultural Capabilities Across Whole of Government for an Effective COIN Strategy
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 9 |
An Exit Strategy Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons from the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67
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In: DTIC (2012)
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| 10 |
Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations: A New Paradigm
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In: DTIC (2012)
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Abstract:
Military intelligence often fails to provide commanders and policymakers with an effective understanding of complex counterinsurgency (COIN) environments. This failure stems in great part from a failure to deliver holistic, fused analysis.2 Most analyses of complex environments are derived from a systems analysis model that artificially deconstructs both the environment and the people and groups within that environment. Treating complex environments, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, as a system that can be broken into simply labeled component parts leads analysts to make unhelpful and logically unsound assumptions regarding human identity. These assumptions, in turn, undermine analytic effectiveness. Instead of fusing available information in a way that accurately reflects the inherently complex shades-of-gray ground truth, military analysts influenced by systems analysis and conventional military doctrine often channel their thinking and efforts into three artificially color-coded categories: red, white, and green.3 These colors represent, respectively, the enemy, the population, and the host nation.
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Keyword:
*COUNTERINSURGENCY; *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; *MILITARY OPERATIONS; FAILURE; MILITARY COMMANDERS; MILITARY DOCTRINE; Military Intelligence; Military Operations; POLICIES; Strategy and Tactics; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
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URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA562681
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA562681
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| 12 |
Two Sides of the Same Coin or Different Coins Altogether Counterinsurgency from Indigenous Government and Occupier Perspectives
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| 13 |
Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan
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In: DTIC (2011)
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| 14 |
The Cognitive Battlefield: A Framework for Strategic Communications
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In: DTIC (2011)
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| 15 |
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence - Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations
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In: DTIC (2011)
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| 17 |
Interaction of Language, Culture and Cognition in Group Dynamics for Understanding the Adversary
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In: DTIC (2010)
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| 18 |
Military Training: Continued Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to Improve Language Skills and Regional Proficiency
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In: DTIC (2010)
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| 19 |
Turning the Tide: Refocusing Stability Operations in Afghanistan
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In: DTIC (2010)
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| 20 |
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
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In: DTIC (2010)
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